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Think tanks, Tories and the austerity discourse coalition
Hartwig Pautz
School of Media, culture and Society, University of the West of Scotland, Paisley, UK
ABSTRACT
Political parties change their policy positions for a variety of reasons. 
Among these can be changing interpretations of economic or other 
kinds of knowledge. The article investigates whether think tanks, as 
producers, synthesisers and disseminators of knowledge, may have 
contributed to changes in the British Conservative Party’s positions on 
public spending, debt and deficit following the Global Financial Crisis 
and the onset of the Great Recession between 2008 and 2009. The 
article does not seek to attribute causality to think tanks’ activities and 
the Conservatives’ changing positions on public spending. However, it 
proposes that think tanks were relevant actors in the British ‘austerity 
discourse coalition’ and were, more specifically, relevant for the 
Conservatives’ adoption of a strict austerity agenda. The article also 
emphasises that think tanks should be considered as relevant actors 
in any analysis of the link between the cognitive dimension of public 
policy and political action.
Highlights
•  Think tanks helped the British Conservative Party to revise their pre-crisis spending 
policies and to become ‘the party of austerity’
•  Think tanks were relevant actors in the austerity ‘discourse coalition’
•  Think tanks supported the Conservatives in their preparations for government
•  Between journalists and think tanks exist tight networks, worthy of closer scrutiny
Introduction
How do political parties’ policy positions, for example on desirable levels of public spending, 
taxation or macro-economic policy, change? And which are the factors that may contribute 
to such change? Research suggests that parties revise their policies in response to shifts in the 
position of the mean voter or the party voter or after electoral defeat (Adams, Clark, Ezrow, 
& Glasgow, 2004; Adams, Haupt, & Stoll, 2009; Schumacher, de Vries, & Vis, 2013). A change 
of party leadership can also have significant consequences on policy positions (Harmel, Heo, 
Tan, & Janda, 1995). New knowledge or changing interpretations of knowledge may also lead 
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to revisions of policy positions (Radaelli, 1998). This article focuses on the last factor: the 
role of knowledge and of the organisations producing, repackaging and disseminating such 
knowledge with the aim of affecting policy positions and the wider climate of opinion. In 
particular, focus is on how knowledge in the form of think tank output may have influenced 
the British Conservative Party’s U-turn on its commitment, made in opposition and prior to 
Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession, to match the then Labour Party Government’s 
spending plans and to subsequently become the party of austerity. This U-turn occurred at 
some point between 2005 and 2010, before the Conservatives became the strongest party at 
the 2010 general election and formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, 
and after David Cameron was elected party leader in 2005.
The article proceeds as follows. After a brief discussion of the study of think tanks in 
the wider context of debates about the role of ideas in policy-making, and after research 
questions and analytical approach are outlined, the Conservative Party’s U-turn is described. 
Then the article’s main part presents the analysis of how think tanks may have contributed 
to this change of policy positions. The conclusion also presents thoughts for future research.
Studying think tanks: ideas matter
The study of think tanks is based on the assumption that ideas and the institutions which 
produce, repackage and disseminate them matter both in ‘everyday politics’ and in moments 
of crisis (Blyth, 2010; Seabrook, 2006). The expanding think tank cosmos in Britain and 
elsewhere (see e.g. McGann, 2015) is testament to at least the belief – certainly shared by 
funders and others involved in think tank activities – that think tanks do indeed matter in 
policy-making and politics. The development of the British think tank landscape has been 
accompanied by a growing body of research (e.g. Blackstone & Plowden, 1988; Cockett, 
1994; Desai, 1994; Pautz, 2016; Stone, 1996). This literature has often focused on ‘think tank 
influence’ – whether it exists and, if so, to what extent, whether it has a legitimate place in a 
democratic polity, and whether it can be ‘measured’. This focus is justified given that think 
tanks themselves claim to be all about influencing policy. Some think tanks make grand 
claims in this regard, while others are more reluctant to talk about their relationship to 
powerful elites from government, civil service and business and about how they operate in 
this ‘small world’. Some researchers conceptualise think tanks as actors which, rather than 
influencing concrete policy or public opinion, mostly engage in ‘constructing ideological 
fellowship’ (Denham & Garnett, 1998) through which they seek to assure elites of the validity 
of their views. In similar vein, some portray think tanks as providers of legitimising dis-
courses for political elites’ already existing policy preferences (e.g. Medvetz, 2012). Others 
have emphasised the presence of think tanks in the media and their symbiotic relationship 
as a necessary ingredient of ‘influence’ (Dahl Kelstrup, 2015). Further research, usually 
using case study approaches, has portrayed think tanks as providers of crucial ideational 
support for party leaders seeking to modernise their party in opposition – even against 
internal resistance – and to prepare it for governmental responsibilities (e.g. Pautz, 2012).
The analysis presented in this article also focuses on the potential relevance of think 
tanks for political parties and adopts a case study approach as a valid way of addressing the 
question of influence, agreeing with Radaelli that ‘measurement [of influence, H.P.] in a 
strict sense is probably impossible. However, empirical research can be done’ (Radaelli, 1998, 
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POLICY AND SOCIETY  3
p. 12) which uncovers and critically, yet cautiously, evaluates how think tanks contribute 
to constructing discourse and concrete policies.
Objectives and analytical framework
The central objective of this article is to discuss the role of think tanks in the Conservative 
Party’s U-turn from its commitment to match the 2005–2010 Labour Government’s pub-
lic spending plans as they existed before Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession, to 
becoming Britain’s most ardent ‘austerians’ in the run-up to the 2010 general elections. 
By discussing think tanks, the article contributes to the literature on the role of ideational 
actors in change processes of party policy positions. An analysis of these actors is important 
as it links the cognitive dimension of public policy-making to political action, as Schmidt 
and Scharpf explain: 
the reference to cognitive and normative ideas, whether old or new, cannot explain changes 
of policies or of administrative institutions. Changes are brought about by constellations of 
(individual, corporate, collective) actors with institutionalised action resources, competencies 
and veto positions (Schmidt & Scharpf, 1998, p. 34).
Think tanks are certainly among these actors. More narrowly, the article contributes to the 
discussion of how British policy responses to Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession 
were conceived and to the discussion about the somewhat surprising resilience of the ‘Anglo-
liberal growth model’ and its neo-liberalism to the shock of the crises (e.g. Hay & Smith, 
2013; Schmidt & Thatcher, 2013). The article does so by focusing the analysis on a specific 
set of actors, namely think tanks, in terms of their specific contributions to this resilience. 
This focus means, of course, that a whole raft of other actors is not taken into account in 
the analysis. This includes, for example, civil servants, lobbyists, academics, and interna-
tional and supranational organisations. For a comprehensive empirical analysis, beyond 
the limits of this article, of the ‘strange non-death of neo-liberalism’ (Crouch, 2011) these 
actors should also be considered.
The analysis employs two sets of data. First, data were generated from 11 semi-struc-
tured interviews with think tank staffers, special government advisers and observers of 
Westminster politics. Potential interviewees were contacted on the basis of their personal or 
their institution’s assumed insightful and relevant position in the British policy community. 
Such assumptions were based on the reading of research literature, media commentary, think 
tank output and government publications and any references to particular organisations 
or individuals therein. Many of the interviewees had ‘multiple identities’ – as former think 
tank staffers, former civil servants or as people who had moved from one think tank to the 
next. This means that a wide range of experiences and views materialised in the interviews. 
Interviewees were assured anonymity so that quotations are only attributable to institutions. 
This allowed interviewees to speak more freely. Not all interviews are directly referred to 
in the article; those which are not informed the analysis nonetheless. All interviews were 
conducted by the author in summer 2014, were recorded and transcribed verbatim. As a 
second data source, the article uses published documents pertaining to the Conservative 
Party and its leadership, newspaper articles and think tank publications.
Over time, multiple analytical frameworks – in particular the epistemic community 
concept (Haas, 1989) and the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 1987), but also and 
more recently Bourdieu’s field theory (Medvetz, 2012) – have been applied to research 
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on think tanks. For the purposes of this article, Marten Hajer’s concept of the ‘discourse 
coalition’, an outcome of the ‘argumentative’ (Fischer, 2003) or ‘critical’ turn (Sayer, 1999) 
in policy analysis studies, was chosen.
How is ‘discourse’ understood in this article and what are ‘discourse coalitions’? First, 
discourses are not ‘freely floating’ outside the social contexts through which they are con-
structed but should be seen as ‘a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations, 
that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through 
which meaning is given to physical and social realities’ (Hajer, 1995, p. 44). The construction 
of discourses can be pictured as an argumentative struggle at whose end one discourse dom-
inates the structure of the whole debate on a particular issue (Hajer, 1995, p. 61). It is this 
‘“career” of discursive constructs that becomes the object of research’ (Hajer & Kesselring, 
1999, p. 2) with discourse-analytical means. In other words, discourse analysis shows how 
a particular understanding of a policy problem at some point has gained dominance and 
authoritative status while other understandings are discredited, pushed to the margins or 
silenced. Discourse analysis scrutinises what is said and the institutional context in which 
it is said, it makes sense of texts, understands them in relation to their social background, 
and looks at their content and at whom they are directed.
What is a ‘discourse coalition’ and how is it constituted? A ‘discourse coalition is the 
ensemble of a set of storylines, the actors that utter these storylines, and the practices 
that conform to these storylines, all organized around a discourse’ (Hajer, 1993, p. 47). 
The notion of the ‘storyline’ is central in Hajer’s concept of the discourse coalition. It is 
a linguistic mechanism around which discourse coalitions assemble, a ‘generative sort of 
narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to 
specific physical or social phenomena’ (Hajer, 1995, p. 56). A discourse coalition is held 
together by its members’ shared belief in one particular interpretation of a threat, crisis or 
event which constructs ‘the nature of the policy problem under consideration’ (Hajer, 1995, 
p. 247). Because most political actors do not possess well-developed theories to make sense 
of the physical or social world, an effective storyline is one which simplifies a policy issue 
and ‘condenses large amounts of factual information intermixed with normative assump-
tions and values’ (Fischer, 2003, p. 87) into shorthand for what is usually a complex issue. 
Such shorthand becomes the basis for the emergence of a broad coalition of quite diverse 
actors. Those subscribing to the storyline assume that others in the coalition understand 
what they mean, but ‘the assumption of mutual understanding, however widespread, is often 
false, concealing discursive complexity. Even when actors share a specific set of storylines, 
they might interpret the meaning of storylines rather differently’ (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005, 
p. 177). Storylines, even though they reduce complexity to the degree that large and highly 
diverse coalitions can form around them, have the power to stimulate political change by 
re-ordering meaning when adopted by the members of a discourse coalition.
The discourse coalition concept is appropriate for this research because it allows under-
standing think tanks as one-actor-among-many in a wide network of actors which are not 
necessarily known to each other or interact directly. Think tank outputs in the form of, 
for example, analytical papers, blogs and media commentary, contribute to the making of 
storylines around which discourse coalitions can form or strengthen. Think tanks are also 
physical locations where disparate political actors may meet and where they can generate 
shared storylines.
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POLICY AND SOCIETY  5
The Conservative Party and its turn towards austerity
The Conservative Party, in the early 2000s, was in programmatic disarray. In 2005, David 
Cameron became leader and took his party onto a centrist modernisation path towards 
‘a post-Thatcherite style of liberal Conservatism’ (Kerr, 2007, p. 47) which incorporated 
elements of neo-liberalism, New Labour and One Nation Toryism. The modernisation 
process was structured along three interdependent elements: the ‘Big Society’, ‘Localism’ 
and ‘Compassionate Conservatism’.
The Big Society discourse offered a critique of the power of the central state. The empha-
sis was not on ‘rolling back the state’ but on ‘rolling forward society’ (Cameron, 2007). 
Accepting that there was a ‘thing called society’, Cameron emphasised that it was ‘just not the 
same as the state’ (Cameron, 2005). Closely connected to the idea of the Big Society was the 
Conservatives’ anti-étatiste emphasis on ‘localism’. Local voluntary and community organ-
isations should be ‘enabled’ by the state to mend Britain’s ‘broken society’ (Conservative 
Party, 2006, p. 2). Compassionate Conservatism described a shift from an ‘econo-centric 
paradigm to a socio-centric paradigm’ (Letwin, 2007). During this modernisation process, 
the Tories eschewed any demands for public spending cuts or any criticism of public sector 
organisations such as ‘our NHS’, as Cameron persistently referred to the National Health 
System (e.g. Cameron, 2008b).
Certainly, this modernisation course was neither uncontested within the Conservative 
Party nor did it persuade all organisations and individuals in its orbit. But the Tories’ cen-
trist journey came only to a halt due to the exogenous shocks of Global Financial Crisis 
and Great Recession. As a result of these crises, the party aborted its modernisation course 
which had so much challenged ‘Conservative instincts’ (Bale, 2013, p. 135) and returned 
to an ideology of neo-liberalism and small-but-strong state without, however, adopting the 
zealous anti-public services rhetoric of old or reneging on its liberal social agenda. Rather, 
the Conservatives developed policies under the storyline of the ‘age of austerity’, which they 
deemed ‘inevitable’ due to the need for ‘fiscal consolidation’ after years of ‘Labour profli-
gacy’ and ‘living beyond our means’. This storyline anchored the party within the austerity 
discourse coalition which developed after the Global Financial Crisis and gathered strength 
with the Great Recession.
Between 2005 and 2008, i.e. until the Global Financial Crisis erupted, the oppositional 
Conservatives were committed to maintaining public spending at the level planned by 
the Labour Governments under Tony Blair and then Gordon Brown. Still in September 
2007 – i.e. around the time that the first British bank, Northern Rock, collapsed as a sign of 
things to come – the Conservatives’ shadow chancellor, George Osborne, announced that 
government spending under the Conservatives would rise from £615 billion in 2009 to £674 
billion in 2010/11 to match Labour’s spending plans: ‘Under a Conservative government 
there will be real increases in spending on public services, year after year’ (Osborne quoted 
in BBC, 2007a). But after May 2008, as the Global Financial Crisis unfolded and started 
having an impact on Britain’s economy, Cameron’s policy preferences on spending, debt 
and deficit started changing. He put it to the public that ‘we need to start living within our 
means’ and warned that ‘we have reached the limits of acceptable taxation and borrowing’. 
However, he was careful still to point out that these new realities would not lead to cuts in 
public spending. Instead, Cameron chose the term ‘controlling public funding’ and gave 
assurances that ‘we will give public services the proper funding they need so that everyone 
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in the country can have access to the services they need’ (Cameron, 2008a). However, some 
media commentators and fellow Tories increased the pressure on Cameron and Osborne to 
move more clearly towards austerity. In August 2008, Conservatives Lord Forsyth and John 
Redwood were quoted as calling on ‘the Conservative leader […] to abandon his pledge to 
match Labour spending amid fears that Britain is heading into recession’ (quoted in Kite, 
2008). Slowly accepting this position, David Cameron used his speech at party conference 
in early October 2008 to accuse Labour that its ‘spending splurge left the government 
borrowing money in the good times when it should have been saving money. So now that 
the bad times have hit, there’s no money to help’. This meant that the moment had come to 
‘rein in government borrowing’ (Cameron, 2008c). George Osborne, in late October 2008, 
added to this shift in discourse by saying that a Conservative government would resist 
any notion that a Keynesian stimulus package would be employed: ‘even a modest dose of 
Keynesian spending’ would act as a ‘cruise missile aimed at the heart of recovery’ (Osborne, 
2008). Finally, in November 2008 Cameron explicitly abandoned his party’s pledge to match 
Labour’s spending plans (Cameron, 2008d). Over the course of a year and under the impres-
sions of Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession, the Conservative leadership had made 
a full U-turn on its commitment to maintain public spending at pre-crisis levels and had 
shifted into ‘austerity mode’, even rejecting Labour’s timid Keynesian attempts at stimulating 
the economy.
However, Cameron and his shadow chancellor shied away from putting a number to 
any spending cuts or tax increases until spring 2009. Then the scale of the Global Financial 
Crisis and its impact on Britain’s ‘real economy’ became clear as Britain, in January 2009, 
entered recession. Reacting to this development, in April 2009 Cameron announced that a 
government under his lead would ‘have to take some incredibly tough decisions on taxation, 
spending and borrowing’ (Cameron cited in Summers, 2009). George Osborne clarified at 
the Tory’s 2009 spring conference that for him ‘the root of our problems is too much debt’ 
and that ‘we will make efficiency savings […] but we don’t pretend that they will be enough. 
[.] we can be a “Government of thrift” in an age of austerity’ (Osborne, 2009a).
A little later the Conservatives indicated, for the first time, where spending cuts would 
fall under their government. On 10 June 2009, the Tories’ shadow health secretary, Andrew 
Lansley, said in an interview that spending on all departments would be cut by 10%, with 
health, education and international aid exempted (see Sparrow, 2009). This statement was 
widely interpreted as a gaffe as it allowed Labour to attack the Tories as the ‘party of cuts’. 
While Lansley’s ‘10% message’ may have been unfortunate, since April 2009 it had been 
clear that leading Conservatives were seeing reductions in public spending as an inevitable 
necessity. The public was also increasingly prepared for austerity. For example, the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies (IFS) think tank warned that ‘two full parliaments of mounting austerity’ 
would follow the Chancellor’s April 2009 budget which forecast the biggest deficit in UK 
post-war history (see BBC, 2009c).
Following the ‘June gaffe’, more details became known about how a Conservative govern-
ment would tackle debt and deficit through tax increases and spending cuts (see Hennessy 
& Jamieson, 2009 and Merrick & Brady, 2009). In October, at Conservative conference, 
Osborne demanded a public sector pay freeze (Osborne, 2009d) and said that, under his 
watch, over the next parliament more than £23 billion would be cut from public spending 
to halve the deficit by 2014 (Wintour, 2009). Finally, in April 2010, one month before the 
general election, Osborne put concrete figures to his debt and deficit reduction strategy 
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POLICY AND SOCIETY  7
which had ‘around 80% of the work coming from spending restraint and about 20% from 
tax increases’ (Osborne, 2009c).
After the election of May 2010, the Conservatives formed a coalition government with 
the Liberal Democrats and now had the power to implement their austerity agenda as 
developed in opposition. George Osborne, as new Chancellor, declared that the government 
would abandon all fiscal stimulus measures in favour of rapid and strict fiscal consolidation 
with the aim to reduce the structural budget deficit over five years (Government, 2010a). 
Calling it an ‘unavoidable budget’ (Osborne, 2010), Osborne announced a package of fiscal 
tightening worth £40 billion by 2014/15 of which 80% were to be spending decreases and 
20% tax changes, including an increase of VAT to 20% (Edmonds, Webb, & Long, 2011, 
p. 22). In other words, Britain chose more austere fiscal policies than any other comparable 
country leading to a ‘radical shrinking of the state’ with a particular focus on welfare (Smith 
& Jones, 2015).
Think tanks and the U-turn
Did think tanks play a role in the Conservatives’ U-turn in the wake of Global Financial 
Crisis and Great Recession? Did they, as one of many actors in the austerity discourse coa-
lition, contribute to the authority of the ‘age of austerity’ discourse before the 2010 election?
Think tanks such as Policy Exchange, Reform, the Institute of Economic Affairs and 
the Institute for Government are central to answering these questions. This small sample 
out of a large British think tank population was arrived at on the basis of an analysis of 
the research literature, media reporting, think tank output and government publications 
making reference to particular organisations or individuals.
As outlined earlier, a crucial moment in the Conservatives’ turn not only towards auster-
ity but towards first concrete plans on public spending cuts was the ‘June gaffe’ by Andrew 
Lansley. Prior to 2009 the Conservatives were not convinced that they could convey to the 
electorate that drastic spending cuts were the necessary ‘price’ for supposedly reckless spend-
ing under Labour. In order to argue for austerity without diminishing electoral prospects a
changed political discourse was necessary. […] If someone had published something in 2008 
saying that we should cut £130 billion of public spending then nobody serious would’ve touched 
it with a barge pole,
as someone close to think tank Policy Exchange assessed the situation in 2008 and 2009 
(Interview 1). In particular Greek crisis, Eurozone troubles, UK recession and the growing 
deficit constituted the required ‘exogenous shock’ to open a window of opportunity for 
the Tories to turn the notion of drastic spending cuts from a recipe of political suicide 
into the only ‘game in town’ in the public imagination. Policy Exchange helped pushing 
this window more open by publishing its own recommendations on debt and deficit in a 
short paper – called ‘Controlling Public Spending: the Scale of the Challenge’ – on 3 June 
2009. Co-authored by the think tank’s director (and later special advisor to Osborne in the 
Treasury) Neil O’Brien, a new recruit from economic consultancy Europe Economics and 
former IFS and Institute of Directors economist Andrew Lilico, and later Downing Street 
10 special advisor Adam Atashzai (Lilico, O’Brien, & Atashzai, 2009) it developed some 
influence on Conservative thinking. Lilico had been hired by Policy Exchange as Chief 
Economist in 2009 to bolster the think tank’s economic policy expertise – an area that 
it had hardly addressed prior to the crises, instead focusing on education policy, prison 
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reform or housing. Lilico had already made a name for himself as a vocal supporter of 
steep public spending cuts (e.g. Lilico, 2009a, 2009b; Monaghan & Hennessy, 2008). Rupert 
Harrison, a confidante of Osborne’s and later special advisor at the Treasury where he was 
‘a central figure in devising the government’s deficit reduction programme, as well as suc-
cessive pay freezes’ (Wintour & Syal, 2014), helped to recruit Lilico for Policy Exchange. 
The co- authored paper proposed plugging the hole in Britain’s finances by fiscal tightening 
worth at least £100bn over the next parliament of which 80% were to be spending cuts and 
20% tax changes. The paper made reference to fiscal consolidation programmes in other 
countries – in particular Canada and Sweden in the 1990s – and urged Britain to accept 
the lesson that an economic crisis and high debt and deficit must be dealt with through 
austerity and lower taxes.
The paper is unlikely to have been published without the prior consent of the party 
leadership – ‘Policy Exchange is Cameron’s favourite think tank and they all knew what we 
were going to say before we said it’ (Interview 1) – and sought to put to the test of public 
opinion the notion that severe spending cuts were without alternative. After all, Policy 
Exchange, being much closer to the Conservative Party than, for example, the Institute of 
Economic Affairs (IEA) and other ‘old guard’ think tanks, was at the time known as a ‘float 
organisation’ in the Westminster Village: ‘everyone knows that they will float ideas on behalf 
of Conservatives’ (Interview 2). The media reaction to the paper in outlets considered to 
be ‘relevant’ for the Conservative Party leadership was positive. In particular the paper’s 
proposition that spending cuts should be the main source of fiscal consolidation ‘had quite 
an impact’ (Interview 3), as one observer noted. Martin Wolf in the Financial Times (2009) 
and Roger Bootle in The Daily Telegraph commended the paper. Bootle, for example, argued 
that the government should go 
directly for the thing which is at the root of the problem and cut public expenditure. […] Last 
week the Policy Exchange think tank published a paper showing that the current fiscal plans 
envisage what amounts to a second Gordon Brown public spending splurge. (Bootle, 2009)
By no means were Policy Exchange’s proposals the most radical made to that day. Think 
tanks like Reform and IEA, pressure groups like the Institute of Directors, and campaign 
organisations such as the Taxpayers’ Alliance had come out with more drastic ideas on how 
to reduce debt and deficit. The influential ConservativeHome blog (see e.g. Montgomerie, 
2009) and many in the centre-right mainstream media were also contributing to the general 
discussion:
There was quite an intense debate about the future of public spending and a lot of voices in 
that debate were saying that all parties were going to have to adjust their spending plans in 
the light of the reality. And I think the Conservatives were the first ones to do it (Interview 5)
by adopting the ‘age of austerity’ storyline. However, while IEA and Reform have always 
zealously argued in favour of reducing the size of the state – whether during economic 
upswings or downturns – Policy Exchange’s turn to economic policy and its ‘floating’ of 
austerity ideas helped the Conservative leadership to assess whether austerity would meet 
the consent of those considered to be amongst the ‘key commentariat’ of opinion formers. 
The endorsement in, for example, the Financial Times mattered because of its authoritative 
position in the British media landscape. This is a good moment to point out to the symbiotic 
relationship between think tanks and the media. While think tanks want to see their work 
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POLICY AND SOCIETY  9
endorsed by leading media, the same media is keen to use think tank output, as one think 
tank staffer describes:
You make friends with certain journalists and then you feed them lots of stories all the time, 
including lots of ones that make them look good and that you know have your name on. And 
then, if you give them good stories and they work and it makes them look good, then they 
keep publishing these stories (Interview 1).
It seems that, more generally speaking, media commentary on the rapidly unfolding crises 
between 2007 and 2009 was highly relevant for policy-makers of all colours, perhaps more 
so than in ‘normal times’:
It must have been the first period I’m aware of where something’s happening in real time and 
I almost found out by reading blogs and what people were saying more than anything else. 
Because nobody really knew and people were speculating in blogs and writing articles. So, 
people like Martin Wolf were quite important.
The above quote shows how a special advisor to Prime Minister Gordon Brown described 
the situation between 2007 and 2009 (Interview 6). A director of a centre-right think tank 
seconded: ‘People like [the BBC’s] Robert Peston and [the Financial Times’] Gillian Tett, 
people who could explain what was going on in the crises and media figures who were 
continually reporting were a big focus for policy-makers, not think tanks’ (Interview 5). 
Thus, Wolf ’s and Bootle’s endorsement of Policy Exchange’s paper showed 
that Policy Exchange were in the mainstream of where this discussion [about debt and deficit, 
H.P.] was going to go at that point. […] These were the guys you wanted to convince. […] The 
Conservatives knew they were on a runner
 with what they were now considering to propose publicly (Interview 1).
A week after the paper’s positive reception in the ‘media that matters’, the shadow health 
secretary made his ‘gaffe’ and leading Conservatives abandoned their worries that an agenda 
of spending cuts would inevitably lead to electoral disaster. On the contrary, David Cameron 
and others started to move the Conservative Party firmly into the austerity discourse coa-
lition by employing a successful ‘communicative discourse’ (Schmidt, 2008, p. 4) which 
emphasised the ‘inevitability of consolidation’, evoked national unity by emphasising that 
‘we’re in this together’, and promised to save the country from ‘becoming like Greece’ by 
‘clearing up Labour’s legacy’.
However, some think tanks close to the Conservative Party criticised the party leadership 
for its supposedly timid approach to cutting debt and deficit. These impatient voices within 
the austerity discourse coalition, however, did not do the party leadership any disservice, as 
is shown in the following. Among those demanding more austerity was think tank Reform, 
on the libertarian right of the political spectrum. It had been promoting spending cuts 
alongside the privatisation of public services ever since its foundation in 2001. While it had 
little to say, as most think tanks then, in terms of policy responses to the Global Financial 
Crisis itself, the growing deficit and the increasing debt burden since 2008 presented a 
new opportunity to promote its ideas of privatisation, welfare reform and small state to the 
general public and the Conservative leadership alike: ‘The crisis changed the environment 
of ideas about public spending and public services’ (Interview 5), as a senior think tank 
staffer at Reform said.
Before the Tories’ April 2009 conference at which Osborne embraced the ‘age of austerity’, 
Reform published a paper – ‘Back to Black’ (Bassett et al., 2009). Reform’s explicit objective 
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was to force politicians from across the spectrum to face the supposedly inevitable con-
sequences of the financial and economic crises for public spending; at this point Reform 
found that most leading politicians were afraid of addressing this problem. The paper was 
co-authored, among others, by Conservative MP, Reform deputy director, later government 
minister and free marketeer Elizabeth Truss, also founder of the Free Enterprise Group of 
Conservative MPs. The publication argued against using higher taxes to clear the deficit, 
for drastic reductions of health spending and for the abolition of universal child benefit. In 
total, it urged government to reduce spending by at least £30 billion in 2010–2011. As one 
among many contributions to the debate, the paper was ammunition for the ‘austerians’ 
and ‘enabled people to start saying in public what they were saying in private’ (Interview 
5), as one of Reform’s staffers believes.
Reform was not the only think tank to demand most severe cuts in public spending. The 
Institute of Economic Affairs also contributed to the career of the austerity discourse – rather 
than providing detailed plans for cuts, it operated with ‘higher level arguments’. An IEA staffer 
saw the crisis as a new opportunity for the think tank to infuse its ideas into mainstream 
thinking:
We’ve flourished somewhat in the past five years […] owing to the severe economic difficulties 
and challenges which have opened up spaces for those with more radical ideas to actually get 
a hearing in the media, in the corridors of power, and the wider public take a greater interest 
in the sort of ‘Hell, what are we going to do now?’ type questions (Interview 4).
This marked a change for the fortunes of IEA as before 2009, the IEA regarded the 
Tories’ acceptance of Labour’s spending levels as ‘an ideological defeat’ (Interview 4) and 
the Conservative leadership had few dealings with the IEA. But now IEA’s persistent push 
for drastic cuts rendered the think tank useful to the Conservative Party – maybe not so 
much in the sense of the Tories adopting IEA’s ideas or ideology, but rather in the sense of 
‘triangulation’. Set both against IEA’s radical proposals and against those arguing for coun-
ter-cyclical Keynesian fiscal stimuli measures, George Osborne’s positions appeared mod-
erate. While neither IEA nor Conservative Party strategists planned this triangulation – it 
‘wasn’t co-ordinated, this wasn’t an agreed public relations strategy with the Conservatives’ 
(Interview 4) – radical proposals such as that coming from IEA helped the Conservative 
leadership make a convincing case for their ideas as the ‘most rational’ and ‘balanced’.
Not only those think tanks easily identifiable as ‘centre-right’ but also less partisan and 
less ideologically outspoken think tanks influenced the Conservatives’ thinking ahead of the 
2010 elections. For example, the Institute for Government (IfG) assisted the Conservatives 
to draw lessons from episodes of fiscal consolidations in Sweden and Canada and thus 
helped the Tories develop the argument that austerity will bring about economic recovery 
also in the UK and thus benefit everyone. As an IfG staffer said:
The way in which we took lessons from Canada; it was used as an example of the case for the 
importance of controlling spending. It was part of a much higher-level debate, actually. It was 
used in the ‘We do need to cut’ context, I think, politically. And it was used to say ‘We can cut 
the deficit’ so it’s a sort of a positive story to create motivation and to show, I think, that the 
consequences of some cuts wouldn’t be disastrous (Interview 2).
Furthermore, analysis developed at IfG assured the Conservative leadership that public 
spending cuts would not necessarily be disastrous electorally: ‘Undertaking comprehensive 
strategic reviews which resulted in balanced budgets, reduced public debt and sustained 
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economic performance [led to] governments which initiated these reviews [being] repeat-
edly re-elected’ (McCrae, Myers, & Glatzel, 2009, p. 6), as an IfG report reads.
Lastly, the think tank also helped, though not explicitly or exclusively, to prepare the 
Conservative Party for government. Throughout 2009, IfG ran a series of seminars focusing 
on Swedish and Canadian experiences of how severe spending cuts could be best imple-
mented without jeopardising cabinet unity – after all, some departmental portfolios would 
be more seriously affected by cuts than others, thus creating the potential of highly disrup-
tive conflicts over resources. In June 2009, George Osborne was reportedly considering 
committing the shadow cabinet to binding spending cuts if the Conservative Party were 
to gain power at the next election: ‘shadow cabinet sources said the idea is modelled on 
cabinet discussions held by the Labour government in the 1970s, and would force depart-
ment heads to agree how spending will be brought under control’, as the Daily Telegraph 
reported (Kirkup, 2009).
The analysis presented in this section can necessarily convey only a sense of what think 
tanks did to support the Tories’ U-turn back to policies more akin to ‘Conservative instincts’ 
and to build the authority of the ‘age of austerity’ discourse coalition. The limits of this article 
mean that the many more think tanks and other institutions, but also individuals, which 
made contributions to the austerity discourse cannot be discussed here.
Conclusions
While the article makes no claim that causal relationships existed between think tank activity 
and the development of the Conservative Party’s policy positions on public spending, debt, 
and deficit, the thick description showed that think tanks contributed to the Conservative 
Party’s U-turn on public spending by strengthening the austerity discourse coalition. Think 
tanks used their symbiotic relationship with parts of the British media to put ideas for 
austerity measures to the test with the public. In that way, they contributed to convincing a 
wary Conservative leadership that dropping the pledge of matching Labour’s spending plans 
would allow the party to gain economic credibility over the Labour Government. Think 
tanks gave the Conservatives an impetus to develop their austerity agenda and to promote 
austerity as something inevitable – and to use the austerity course as a vote-winner against 
a Labour Government which was successfully painted as the reckless originator of debt and 
deficit. Here, the Conservatives could also rely on a number of journalists and editors in 
an often ‘compliant media’ (Wren-Lewis, 2015) who helped them in the ‘politics of mobili-
zation of consent’ (Gourevich, 1986) against the Keynesian discourse coalition which had 
burgeoned only briefly in 2009. Again, some think tanks were useful for the Tories as their 
proposals for an age of austerity were drastic enough to make the Conservatives’ debt and 
deficit reduction plans appear moderate, also compared to those of the ‘deficit deniers’ in 
the Keynesian camp. In sum, think tanks helped to make the austerity discourse dominant 
and were part of a powerful silencing mechanism which ‘institutionalised certain courses 
of action and at the same time made alternative courses simply inconceivable’ (Radaelli, 
1998, 9).
What do these findings mean for future research? Two related aspects are of particular 
importance. First, the findings emphasise the importance of the relationship between media 
and think tanks in Britain. However, there is too little research which highlights the sym-
biosis and entanglement between media – old and ‘new’ – and think tanks. This gap in the 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 th
e W
es
t o
f S
co
tla
nd
] a
t 0
4:5
3 2
1 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
12   H. PAUTZ
research exists even though think tanks are omnipresent in the British print and electronic 
media and, in addition, fill the Internet with commentary, bypassing the gatekeepers in 
newspapers and TV via their own channels (Pautz & Heins, 2016). The second aspect is 
related to the notion of symbiosis, but maybe more to that of ‘entanglement’. The research 
for the article has shown again how British think tanks – of whatever partisan association 
or ideological orientation – are embedded in a Westminster network whose members know 
each other, were trained at the same universities, have worked in similar jobs, and have had 
the opportunity to swap professional identities in the many revolving doors of this network. 
Therefore, a Social Network Analysis approach could give comprehensive insights into the 
multi-layered entanglements of actors in the Westminster network as it could incorporate 
the whole actor spectrum and thereby provide a more encompassing analysis of the rela-
tionship between ideas and policy positions.
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